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Abstract 
The current rise in the numbers of young British Muslims travelling from the UK to 
Syria has raised a number of questions about the UK Government’s counter-
terrorism strategy and policy. Within the current discourse on radicalisation and 
Syria, listening to the voices of young British Muslims is crucial, if the UK 
Government, the police and other key stakeholders are serious about preventing the 
escalation of young people going out to fight in Syria. This article makes an 
important contribution to helping us better understand young British Muslims’ 
perceptions of the crisis in Syria and offers policy makers some thoughts on how 
best to engage young people in the debate on Syria without demonising them or 
stereotyping them as ‘suspects’. 
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 Introduction  
The former British Prime Minister, David Cameron, argued in a speech in 
Birmingham (in the UK) that we must try to understand the root causes of why so 
many young people are going out to fight in places like Syria. He stated: “It begins – 
it must begin – by understanding the threat we face and why we face it. What we are 
fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an extreme doctrine” (Cameron, 
2015). At the time of writing, there are estimated to be at least 700-800 Britons who 
have travelled to Syria to fight against President Assad’s forces (Whitehead, 2014). 
For example, Talha Asmal, a 17-year-old A-Level student, became the youngest 
ever suicide bomber from Britain, after he was killed when he and three other 
bombers detonated truck bombs attacking an oil refinery in Iraq. Following the news 
of his death, his family said: “He was ordered to his death by so-called Isis handlers 
and leaders too cowardly to do their own dirty work” (Malik and Siddique, 2015).   
Recent evidence has shown that a number of these individuals travelling to Syria to 
join Isis are in fact young British Muslims (International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalisation, 2013). This article attempts to reach a better understanding of the 
perception of young British Muslims in relation to the current discourse on Syria. In 
doing so, it utilises a qualitative case study with 50 interviews held with young British 
Muslims across the UK. All the young people were aged between 14 and 25 and 
they came from within different areas of the locations listed (discussed in more detail 
below). The study found that there are both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that lead people 
towards a path of radicalisation. They include: anger; frustration; perceived injustice; 
exclusion; issues of belonging and identity (Awan, 2012; Amghar, 2007; Bartlett and 
Miller, 2012; Bayat and Herrera, 2010; Silke, 2008; Tufail and Poynting, 2013; Ryan, 
2014).   
Home-Grown Extremism and the UK Policy Response 
Radicalisation is a complex process and has been defined by the UK Government as 
“the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism 
leading to terrorism” (HM Government, 2011: 108). Radicalisation therefore involves 
individuals who may have been influenced by a culture of violent activities who hope 
to express their feelings with acts of violence which can often be linked to terrorist 
attacks. This may lead to a change in a person’s behaviour, beliefs, attitudes and 
activities (Silke, 2008). De-radicalisation, on the other hand, involves methods and 
techniques used to reverse the radicalisation process through softer forms of social 
control. As this study will show, radicalisation may in some cases start with 
individuals who are searching for an identity. This forms part of the social identity 
theory that is based upon an assertion that radicalisation develops when people are, 
first, confused about their identities and, second, search for a meaning for their role 
within society or in a community (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010).  
Tajfel and Billig (1974) argue that this sense of social isolation leads to a perception 
of discrimination and prejudice, which in turn leads to individuals’ reactions being 
shaped from a belief that violence is a legitimate response to what are deemed to be 
‘oppressive’ foreign policies, counter-terrorism legislation and Islamophobia (Allen 
2010; Hillyard 1993). For Tufyal Choudhury (2007), this is also based on societal 
characteristics that view radicalisation through individuals’ intimate interactions with 
extremists, who often influence these individuals to commit acts of terrorism. He 
argues that the radicalisation process starts with a perception of inequality within 
society that is often based on a lack of trust in UK politics, security and law 
enforcement agencies (Choudhury, 2007: 6).   
This study provides insights into how young people view radicalisation as they 
approach it from a position of social isolation, which leads to alienation, grievance 
and violence (Campbell and Connelly, 2008). As a result, the study’s findings 
suggest that societal causal factors influence how people view the process whereby 
violent actors use a variety of recruitment tactics, such as personal meetings, social 
activism and online indoctrination (Wiktorowicz, 2005). It is clear that socio-economic 
and cultural factors also play a role in determining who becomes radicalised (Silke 
2005; Glees and Pope, 2005). Therefore, one of the important aspects of 
radicalisation for young people is the process from naive and vulnerable individuals 
to would-be terrorists. Broader research indicates that causal factors of radicalisation 
such as deprivation, foreign policy, self-identity issues, lack of integration and a 
sense of grievance impact upon the way people turn to terrorism (Hoffman, 2006).     
In Britain, the rising tide of people going to fight in Syria has caused real concern for 
young British Muslims, their families, communities, policy makers and the police who 
are attempting to curb this increase.  
In doing so, the British Government has enacted counter-terrorism laws and given 
the police broader powers to help tackle the phenomenon (Bakker et al., 2013; 
Beski-Chafiq, et al., 2010; Bhatti, 2011; Billaud, 2015; Borum, 2011). For example, 
the previous Home Secretary announced recently that those travelling to Syria could 
expect lengthy sentences on their return and in some cases they would have their 
passports confiscated and be stripped of their nationality (BBC News, 2014). In one 
case, Majida Sarwar, from Birmingham (UK), went to the police when she realised 
her son, Yusuf Sarwar had left for Syria in May 2013. Sarwar had left a note for his 
mother admitting that he had gone to Syria to help “the oppressed and to fight the 
enemies of Allah there”. After he returned in January 2014, he was arrested and 
detained in Belmarsh high security prison and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment 
(McVeigh, 2014). In 2013, the former Home Secretary, Theresa May, had drawn 
attention to 20 dual-nationals who were receiving ‘deprivation of citizenship orders’. 
The Home Office stated:  
The government will take all necessary steps to protect the public. 
Citizenship is a privilege, not a right, and the Home Secretary will remove 
British citizenship from individuals where she feels it is conducive to the 
public good to do so. (Ross and Galey, 2015)   
At the same time, concerns have been raised by those who argue that these 
measures impinge upon people’s civil liberties (Kundnani, 2014; Vertigans, 2010; 
Cheong and Halverson, 2010; Cottee and Hayward, 2011; Doosje, et al; 2013). For 
example, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 has allowed for the 
temporary seizure of passports and, through the use of Temporary Exclusion Orders, 
can prevent the return of any British citizens who are suspected of committing 
terrorism-related offences abroad. The UK Government counter-terrorism policy is 
enshrined in its CONTEST and Prevent strategy. The focus of CONTEST is to 
reduce the risk of international terrorism to the United Kingdom, while the Prevent 
Strategy's main aim and goal is to stop and prevent people from becoming terrorists 
or supporting terrorism, using softer forms of community engagement to help 
achieve this aim (Awan and Blakemore, 2013). The Prevent programme and 
‘Channel’ interventions are used as initiatives that address those most vulnerable to 
the ideology of extremism and terrorism or those at risk of radicalisation, by putting 
them through de-radicalisation programmes. It has become a mandatory duty for 
public sector agencies to look out for signs of extremism and potential vulnerability to 
radicalisation. In London alone, a total of 1,069 people have been referred to the 
Channel programme since 2012 (Woods, 2015). Guru (2015: 41) states: “Work with 
younger children, through Channel, adopts a more psychological perspective based 
on human development, life-course approaches and psychometric tests, screening 
and profiling.” 
According to the London Assembly, since September 2014, 400 Channel referrals 
had been made for teenagers and children under 18 and 450, including 300 under-
18s, as part of the “Prevent Case Management” process (Woods, 2015). Further 
measures to govern what people can access online have been introduced by the 
Government as it attempts to manage the illegal material available through the work 
of the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. Alongside these statistics have been 
a growing number of cases of young British Muslims caught travelling to Syria to join 
groups such as Isis. For example, the case of three young girls from Bethnal Green, 
London, caused significant concerns about their motives and what inspired them to 
leave their home and travel to Syria (Dodd and Gani, 2015). Therefore, the main 
reason for interviewing young British Muslims for this study was to gather their 
perceptions and understanding of the process that leads to radicalisation in light of 
the current crisis in Syria. This is important because there is a wide body of literature 
that examines counter-terrorism impacts but very little empirical evidence related to 
young British Muslims. The article examines below in more detail the role young 
British Muslims have played in this crisis. 
 
 
Young British Muslims, Citizenship and Rehabilitation 
Apart from the issues concerning how to prevent people from going to fight in Syria, 
there is also increasing concern about what to do with returnee fighters (Guru, 2015). 
The desire for many of these individuals to return offers an opportunity for 
rehabilitation and many of these individuals could provide a counter-narrative that 
might be used in discussion of the dangers of joining Isis and helping prevent future 
generations from taking that route. Previous studies conducted with Muslim 
communities include those by Choudhury and Fenwick (2011), who examined the 
impact of counter-terrorism measures across Britain, including in Birmingham, 
London, Glasgow and Leicester. Their study, which used a series of focus groups, 
found that Muslims felt they were a suspect community. After the 7/7 terrorist attacks 
in Britain in 2005, the UK Government had to act in a way that would challenge 
modern terrorism and its sophisticated terrorist networks, and at the same time 
remain proportionate and fair. However, many British Muslims have consequently 
become the victims of hard-line government policy, and so view counter-terrorism 
measures with a sense of suspicion, fear and apprehension. For example, the 
Muslim Council of Britain (2015) found that young Muslims felt they were being 
victimised by law enforcement agencies and were uneasy overall about counter-
terrorism legislation. Moreover, the study by Hickman et al. (2011) showed that 
Muslim communities overall were suspicious and in fear of counter-terrorism policies 
and agencies, which had resulted in their feeling stigmatised. Indeed, Choudhury 
and Fenwick’s (2011) study into counter-terrorism policies also found that Muslim 
communities felt stigmatised and isolated because of the current anti-terror 
legislation and policies.  
In the absence of a meaningful policy in this area, the UK risks abandoning these 
young people, who are then likely to resort to extreme and radical groups because 
they are able to offer them a greater sense of identity, belonging, unity and security 
(Dodd and Gani, 2015; Drissel, 2011; Harris and Roose, 2014; Hogg and Adelman, 
2013). Coppock and McGovern (2015: 242) state:  
As the object of the discursive construction not only of the ‘Islamic terrorist 
other’ but also of those supposedly susceptible to ‘radicalisation’, young 
British Muslims are therefore constituted as ‘vulnerable’ in politically 
powerful ways, as the ‘would-be terrorist’. This is shaped not only by 
particular, ideologically charged and contentious ideas about how 
‘radicalisation’ allegedly takes place but also by constructing both the 
‘Islamic’ and ‘child’ selves of young British Muslims in very specific ways. 
In Denmark, a country that has seen a huge increase in the number of foreign 
fighters travelling to join Isis, they have created a unique method of helping jihadists 
reintegrate back into society. The Denmark model includes practical help that 
involves medical assistance, counselling and helping returnees with job applications. 
This form of early collaboration between agencies and ex-foreign fighters is proving 
to be a success, as Steffen Nielsen from East Jutland Police who is engaged in the 
programme has noted:  
Everybody is in agreement, early prevention of terrorism is needed. And 
so we start out with dialogue. We screen each fighter, we assess their 
needs. We engage with their families and friends, and their mosque, so 
that they have a well-functioning network around them. This can reduce 
the risk of them being further radicalised. (Soni, 2014)   
This article argues that, if young returnees feel disillusioned, marginalised and 
alienated by state measures, we risk jeopardising any chances of meaningful 
engagement and opportunity for change. There follows an examination of the 
research project in more depth. 
The Research Study 
The interviews were conducted between 2015 and 2016 and each interview lasted 
for approximately 30 minutes. The interviews were conducted within the context of 
the current discourse on young people and radicalisation threats within Syria. None 
of the individuals had been involved with any radicalisation programmes and at least 
10 participants wanted further information about the meaning of radicalisation. 
Interestingly, as the researcher began the interview process, five participants asked 
whether this study was a Home Office approved project. When it was explained that 
this was an independent small-scale academic study, they all agreed to take part. As 
noted above, the aim of this research project was to develop a better understanding 
of how young British Muslims feel about the current crisis in Syria. Specifically, the 
objectives were to explore the current policy that exists around young people fighting 
abroad, examine the nature of support available to them and gather the perceptions 
of young British Muslims in relation to such policies.   
The study utilised a qualitative approach in gathering the perceptions of 50 young 
British Muslims through interviews. This foundation is informed by a focus upon the 
voices of the participants. The random sample included interviews with people based 
in areas where there is a record of people travelling from the UK to Syria and joining 
Isis (BBC News, 2015) and included 25 young British Muslim males and 25 young 
British Muslim females from various cities as follows: 10 from Birmingham; 10 from 
London; 10 from Bradford; 5 from Cardiff; 5 from Luton and 10 from Manchester. 
Muslims form 4.8% of the overall population in England and Wales (Census 2011).  
All the young people were aged 14-24 and came from different areas of the locations 
listed above. The ethnic background of participants also varied; the highest number 
were of Pakistani heritage (20), followed by Somalia (13); India (4); White British 
convert (7); Libya (3) and Egypt (3). Access was negotiated by liaising with 
community members and also through contacts suggested by community members. 
A snowball methodology was used from within the community to gain access, which 
meant visiting families, young people in the area, mosques, youth clubs and parents.   
Interviews allowed the authors to obtain an overview of opinions and experiences of 
young British Muslims with respect to the current crisis in Syria.  
Almost 76% of Muslims live in Greater London, West Midlands, the North West and 
Yorkshire and Humberside. Overall, 35 Local Authority Districts have a 10% or 
above Muslim population. Interestingly, the Muslim population in the London 
Borough of Tower Hamlets rose from 71,000 in 2001 to 88,000 in 2011, 8.1% of all 
school-age children (aged 5-15) are from a Muslim background, and 46% of the 
Muslim population live in the most deprived areas of England (Census 2011). Of all 
of the cities and districts where the interviews were conducted, Bradford has the 
largest Muslim population (24.7%) (Census 2011). All data collection instruments 
used (e.g. interview questions and topic guides for participants) were framed and 
worded selectively. The questions were based on the topic of young British Muslims 
travelling to Syria, and were provided by the author, who also acted as moderator. 
The questions were: 
 Why do you think so many young Britons have travelled to fight in Syria?  
 By what means are these people being radicalised? 
 What is the appeal of Isis for those who have gone to join them or may be 
planning on doing so in the future?  
 Why do we hear stories of so many young Muslim girls travelling to Syria? 
 What would you recommend as the best ways to help prevent young people 
going to Syria?  
 Should those who have gone be reintegrated back into society? If so, how? 
Recordings of the interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed. 
Participants of the interviews consented to being involved in a participant process 
that involved reading and clarifying a summary of the role of the interview before the 
process. Audio-recordings were transcribed verbatim and participants’ names were 
all changed to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. Transcripts were read and 
annotated to develop themes, which are defined below. Clearly, a short qualitative 
study such as this, raises the issue of the need for further research with a larger 
sample size that would provide a more representative view of young British Muslims. 
However, this study aimed to provide a timely snapshot of young British Muslims’ 
views on the current crisis in Syria and what they think has driven so many people to 
travel there to join Isis.   
Each interviewee was debriefed and had to fill out a consent form and participant 
information sheet. This included information including the possible of a risk that any 
third party might be harmed physically or psychologically by their taking part in this 
research. Participation in the study was voluntary and individuals were only 
interviewed or took part in the data gathering exercises after they had given their 
informed consent. Every effort was made to negate the possibility of anxiety or 
disruption. The style of questions was non-threatening and non-coercive. This is a 
sensitive area and the ethical issues involved include: 1) Impartiality – all research 
must be conducted in an ethical way, including respect for individuals, beneficence, 
and justice. It is essential that the researcher remain impartial throughout the study; 
(2) Consent – the research must be conducted overtly, with the full co-operation of 
the police force and the research subjects, and with the latter being made aware of 
that fact (Informed Consent); (3) Privacy – in terms of ensuring all electronic data 
and hard data are stored appropriately; (4) Confidentiality – like privacy, this is 
incumbent upon the researcher and information should be treated with the utmost 
respect; (5) Discovery of criminality (or planned criminality) during the research and 
(6) Researcher safety.   
These ethical issues were dealt with by planning, openness and transparency 
throughout the research. Gaining consent and building trust was important to ensure 
a stronger outcome for the research. Access needed to be given by various members 
in the community in order for the research to go ahead. It was anticipated that the use 
of information sheets explaining the purpose of the study and potential risks, and 
participants were invited to participate by signing a consent form.  Information sheets 
were provided at various stages of the research and all measures were undertaken to 
keep the data retrieved secure. All the information and consent forms explained to 
research subjects that the data they provided would be kept confidential. If, during the 
course of the research, the research team uncovered any actual or planned criminal 
acts, it was noted that these would be disclosed to the relevant authorities. The fact 
that this disclosure took place at the outset of the study allowed for a more robust 
study. 
Results and Discussion 
Social Media, Identity and Belonging   
Those interviewed held a range of perspectives on the current crisis in Syria but 
there was overwhelming evidence of significant concerns with respect to how the 
Internet is being used to radicalise young people. The study found that many 
participants felt that young British Muslims had a sense of lack of identity and 
belonging. In many cases, participants spoke about how young people were 
‘confused’ and are searching for an identity. This article argues that, as a result, Isis 
are able to use a powerful marketing brand that transcends all boundaries and has 
created a central identity with which many of these young people have identified.   
 
Q. Why do you think so many young Britons have travelled to fight in Syria? 
(Frequency of response) 
 
 
As noted above, there were a range of opinion as to why the participants thought 
people were joining Isis, one of the key reasons being the UK’s foreign and domestic 
policy and others including issues of identity and belonging. These reasons are 
explored further under the respect themes. For example, Sarah Khan (Somalia, 15) 
asked: “What does it mean to be British or even Muslim today? I’m not sure and I 
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think those fighting for Isis also don’t know.” Indeed, some participants spoke about 
how Isis were using this to create a global ‘ummah’ and unity, which was seeking to 
help a lot of people find a comfortable space where they felt part of a brotherhood. 
Clearly, one of the pathways to radicalisation is found when individuals are searching 
for an identity and belonging.  For example, Muhammed Khan (British Pakistani, 16) 
said: “Some of these people don’t have anywhere where they believe is home. So 
they think yes let’s jump to these guys (Isis) because them are bringing me to a 
global brotherhood.” Fatima Ali (Pakistani, 18) added: “I was really surprised to hear 
about these young girls going to fight there. I mean what do they think they will 
achieve? I guess they think it’s some sort of Muslim state they are going to.”  
 
These views were echoed by at least 35 participants who said that they felt some of 
these young people who were lacking this sense of belonging were being enticed 
online by groomers who were able to use the Internet to radicalise them. Maryam 
Fazeen (Somalia, 19) said: “A lot of them have smart phones, iPads and computers 
now. So all they do is go online and some preacher then tells them to come and fight 
for Islam. But they don’t realise they are getting themselves into real danger.” 
Mustafa Amin (Egyptian, 20) said: “Isis are really playing a powerful game online. 
Lots of young Muslims are using social media and Isis are definitely aware of this. 
Especially as a lot of ‘em play video games at home and I would say get conditioned 
now to fight.” 
Social media platforms have a huge global reach and audience, with YouTube 
boasting more than 1 billion users each month. This amounts to 6 billion hours of 
video being watched each month, and 100 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube 
every month (YouTube Statistics, 2014). Similarly, Twitter has on average 350,000 
tweets being sent per minute and 500 million tweets per day (Twitter, 2014), whilst 
Facebook remains the largest social media network with 500 million active users and 
55 million people sending updates (Fiegerman, 2014). Clearly, Isis have been using 
these platforms as magnets and they have attracted thousands of views, comments, 
forums and posts. For example, through the use of videos posted on YouTube, it 
began its one billion campaign, which called upon Muslims to join Isis. The videos 
attracted huge audiences and were accompanied with the words: ‘Proudly support 
the Muslim cause’ (Irshaid, 2014).  
Q: By what means are young people likely to be radicalised? (frequency of 
response) 
 
Khadija (Somalia, 16) said: “If people are watching these videos online then they are 
going to be radicalised because Isis are using the Internet to shout out to them that 
we (Muslims) are being oppressed.” Similarly, Faris Ahmed (Libyan, 18) noted that: 
“Isis are using Twitter and Facebook to recruit young people. I always see it online 
and know its’ happening.” The Isis social media nerve centre is its Al Hayat Media 
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Centre (2014), which is sending many of these messages, showing the propaganda 
tools it is using. A number of these videos also depict Isis as fighters with a ‘moral 
conscience’ and show them helping protect civilians and some show Isis members 
visiting injured fighters in hospitals and offering children sweets. These videos also 
form part of a wider series called ‘Mujatweets’, which are produced in high quality 
HD and with powerful imagery. They are reinforced by online podcasts made by 
British Isis fighters on the ground, such as Abu Summayyah al-Britani (Lucas, 2014).   
Furthermore, Sageman (2008) argues that terrorist groups use online chat rooms 
and forums as they are ideal places for people to join them and become radicalised 
in a virtual world of social movements, although Wiktorowicz (2005) argues that, 
rather than using online technologies, radicalisation may involve face-to-face 
meetings where radical groups work in partnerships by gathering intelligence on 
people they deem potential recruits for extremist groups.    
Hussein Ali (Pakistani, 21) said: “The Internet is the biggest way Isis have been 
radicalising people. Because it’s so easy and free to do, they know no one can catch 
them and young people are always online.” Khalid Anas (Egypt, 15) also said: “A lot 
of my friends are on Facebook and a lot of them are watching stuff online that are 
extreme.” Furthermore, Isis had released a free to download app, ‘The Dawn of Glad 
Tidings’, that kept users updated with the latest news from the organisation. The app 
was promoted online and was available on the google android system, before it was 
detected and suspended. The app once downloaded allowed users to see and 
monitor tweets, links, hashtags, images, videos and comments posted on their 
specific accounts. Most of the content was regulated by Isis’s social media arm 
(Chasmar, 2014).    
Thrill-seekers, Fantasists and Faith 
The study found a range of opinions of young British Muslims who felt that some 
young people were simply going to fight in Syria because they were ‘bored’. Others 
expressed the view that they were looking for an adrenaline rush and wanted to 
pursue the chance to fulfil that desire. Harris Hussein (Pakistani, 18) said: “Some of 
these young people are going to Syria just because they are bored. They want some 
excitement in their lives and are pushing those boundaries.” Sidrah Farah (Somalia, 
20) argued a similar point. She said: “What we are seeing really is just some young 
frustrated teenagers who are looking for an escape. Some of them are not even 
religious but because Isis tells them it’s about religion they all think this is jihad. But 
that isn’t true.” Interestingly, some participants argued that some young people 
simply did not have a choice because they were being regarded as a problem group. 
Khalid Farooq (Indian, 21) said: “These young people have been brainwashed into 
believing that everything there (Syria) is like some sort of paradise.”   
 
Notions of how young people may go to fight and want to seek paradise was a 
recurring theme for a number of participants. For example, Sabrina Kauser (Somalia, 
17) said: “These people actually think they might go paradise and are really dumb! I 
mean have they ever read the Qu’ran? I actually think they are not Muslims.” Isis 
have continuously invoked religion to argue that what they are doing is ‘Islamic’ and 
that they are part of a global ‘Islamic state’. Such inferences have been drawn in the 
recent case of a family who travelled from Bradford to Syria because they felt that 
this was a religious ‘obligation’.   
 
Q: What is the appeal of Isis for those who have gone to join them or may be 
planning on doing so in the future? (Frequency of response) 
 
 
The UK Government has attempted to dismiss suggestions of links between Islam 
and the actions of Isis, although they note that the religious ideology of young people 
needs to be debated and critiqued. Ali Khan (Pakistani, 18) said: “I am actually now 
worried if I can use the word Jihad. But these guys are not Muslims so I don’t know 
why everyone keeps saying it’s Islam and us (Muslims) as the problem.” Nafeeza Ali 
(Somalia, 17) said: “It keeps getting to me that it’s us Muslims and we are somehow 
the problem. I am a Muslim and I am proud. But that don’t make me a terrorist.”  
 
Q: Why do we hear stories of so many young Muslim girls travelling to Syria? 
(Frequency of response) 
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Samina Ali (Pakistani, 19) said: “These young people are simply in a dream world. 
They think everything is a game.” Muhammed Ali (Somalia, 19) said: “I think they are 
living in a fantasy. Somehow they will get into paradise because they are martyrs. 
They just don’t get it.” A number of participants highlighted the way the culture of 
gaming could also have had an impact upon these young people. Abdullah (Somalia, 
16) said: “These people are getting an adrenaline rush because they are watching 
and partaking in fighting on the battlefield online. That makes them much more 
violent.” Sabah (Somalian, 21) said: “These individuals are talking about the moral 
duty to fight. Many of these individuals are also watching video games and playing 
violent ones that make them more radical. 
 
Foreign and Domestic Policy and Reintegration 
In his speech in Birmingham, the former British Prime Minister, David Cameron said: 
“Some argue it’s because of historic injustices and recent wars, or because of 
poverty and hardship. This argument, what I call the grievance justification, must be 
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challenged” (Cameron, 2015). However, a number of participants we spoke to 
discussed foreign policy as a key part of why they thought young British Muslims 
were fighting in Syria. For example, Mohammed Jabran (Indian, 16) said: “For me, 
it’s all about foreign policy. I actually know some of the boys that went from here and 
they were always talking about the problems in Palestine and the fact our 
government never helps them.” This was not a solitary opinion; Musa Malik (Convert, 
19) said: “It’s sad, because I think people believe these guys just grew up and 
became terrorists. Trust me they didn’t. They have normal lives but because of what 
they see they think they need to do something because it’s morally correct.” 
Indeed, Lady Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5, has noted that the 
Iraq war had been a catalyst for recruiting terrorists: “It increased the terrorist threat 
by convincing more people of Osama Bin Laden's claim that Islam was under attack 
was correct” (Manningham-Buller, 2011). It does appear that many of the young 
British Muslims also felt there was a causal link between foreign and domestic policy 
and people travelling abroad to fight for Isis. Zulfikhar Ahmed (Convert, 18) said: “A 
lot of my friends talk about foreign policy because it matters to us. When we see 
pictures of dead Muslims being shot in places like Syria it makes you think and want 
to act and do something. Don’t get me wrong I don’t feel that passionate but I know 
people who are.” Muddassar Ali (Pakistani, 24) added: “I think the Government are 
completely bonkers. How can you say foreign and domestic policy doesn’t matter? 
Just look at the new Terrorism Act which means we are all looking for jihadists in our 
own homes. It’s shocking.” 
The problem with current counter-terrorism policies is that they have the potential to 
profile Muslims as extremists and ‘suspects’ (Awan, 2012). As a result, some young 
people have felt that they were viewed as a ‘problem’ group who pose a risk to 
society. Innes et al., (2011) also found that Muslims overall did trust their police 
forces when it came to delivering Prevent programmes, and that young British 
Muslims did not trust the police. The study used evidence and statistics from the 
British Crime Survey and found overall that young British Muslim men’s attitudes 
towards the policing of Prevent were negative.   
Many of the participants cited wider tactics and also face-to-face meetings as 
potential means of radicalisation. Hira Anam (Somalia, 18) said: “Some of these 
youngsters are getting into gangs and then they turn to violence. They will end up 
being expelled from school or college and follow a life of crime.” Abbas (Convert, 17) 
said: “They meet up with people and talk to them in the mosque and other places. 
They ain’t stupid cuz people know them as doing the right thing. They should be 
applauded.” Most of these theories are used by policy makers to inform law 
enforcement agencies and practitioners as to what might lead to radicalisation, but 
they are subjective in nature and also fail to identify the actual ‘root’ causes that lead 
individuals to being vulnerable to radicalisation  
 
Q: What would you recommend as the best ways to help prevent young 
people going to Syria? And should those who have gone, be reintegrated 
back into society? If so, how? (Frequency of response) 
 
  
When asked what participants thought should happen to returnees, the 
overwhelming majority considered that they should be reintegrated into society and 
proposed rehabilitation methods to help achieve this. For example, Aqeel Khan 
(Pakistani, 19) said: “If these young people have gone but want to come back then 
we need to help them and give them a chance. I mean I would go as far as saying 
rehabilitate them. What’s wrong with that?” Similarly, Mohammed Amin (Egypt, 21) 
said: “The Government needs to think of some ways about how you help them. 
Otherwise they are gonna find another extremist group and join them.” In the UK, if 
returnees find themselves stripped of their legal rights and feel shunned by the state, 
there is a real risk, according to most participants, that they maybe (re)drawn to a 
pathway of violence. According to Rashad Asghar (Pakistan, 22): “When people feel 
isolated and angry because they are not being treated with respect and if they go out 
and fight and Syria and when they come back there is no help, then I promise you, 
you will see more terrorism because these young people will think why should I do 
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anything when my own Government don’t care about me.” Similarly, Said Ali 
(Pakistani, 15) said: “I know people and I mean some of my friends who were good 
but when they got arrested and stopped and searched they actually wanted to attack 
the police. I am saying this is the same issue here, because if you are serious about 
beating terrorism then you need young people and their voices otherwise what’s the 
point.” If the UK Government can provide an alternative to these young people, it is 
likely that counter-terrorism programmes can be a success (McCauley and 
Moskalenko, 2008; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2014. Indeed, such work is much 
needed and could help shape a policy and practice approach to returnees.  
Conclusion 
This study has shown that young people feel there is a wide range push and pull 
factors related to why young people have joined groups such as Isis. This study 
provides a short snapshot and overview of how some young British Muslims feel 
about the current crisis in Syria. Clearly, it is not an overall representation of Muslim 
voices and therefore cannot be used as a basis to argue that all Muslims feel this 
way. However, the study has found that young British Muslims feel they are being 
unfairly labelled as extremists and as a result feel stigmatised, alienated and 
marginalised. This can give rise to an ‘Othering’ process, which demonises young 
Muslims as violent extremists (Walklate and Mythen, 2014).   
 
References 
Al Hayat Media Centre (2014) “There’s No Life without Jihad,” YouTube, 19 June. 
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sFltVWWBUYE (accessed 20 May 
2015). 
 
Allen, Chris. Islamophobia. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010). 
 
Amghar, S. (2007) “Salafism and Radicalisation of Young European Muslims,” in S. 
Amghar, A. Boubekeur and M. Emerson (eds), European Islam: Challenges for 
Public Policy and Society, pp. 38–51. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Awan, Imran, “‘I’m a Muslim Not an Extremist:’ How the Prevent Strategy Has 
Constructed a ‘Suspect’ Community,” Politics & Policy, 40: 6 (2012), pp. 1158–
1185. 
 
Awan, Imran, and Blakemore, Brain, Extremism, Counter-Terrorism and Policing. 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). 
 
Bakker, Edwin, Christophe Paulussen, and Eva Entenmann, “Dealing with European 
Foreign Fighters in Syria: Governance Challenges & Legal Implications.” 
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) Research Paper, ICCT – The 
Hague, December 2013. 
 
Bartlett, Jamie, and Miller, Carl. “The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the 
Difference between Violent and Non-Violent Radicalization,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 24: 1 (2012), pp. 1–21. 
 
Bayat, Asef, and Herrera, Linda. “Introduction: Being Young and Muslim in Neo-
Liberal Times,” in L. Herrera and A. Bayat (eds), Being Young and Muslim: New 
Cultural Politics in the Global South and North, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp. 3–26. 
 
BBC News “Powers to Stop British Jihadists Returning to UK – PM.” (2014), 
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30041923 (accessed: 3 July 
2015). 
 
BBC News “Who Are Britain’s Jihadists?” (2015) Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32026985 (accessed 5 August 2015).  
 
Beski-Chafiq, Chahla. Birmant, Jane., Benmerzoug, Hichem.,Taibi, Akim, and 
Goignard, Ariane. Youth and Islamist Radicalisation. Aarhus: Centre for Studies in 
Islamism and Radicalisation, 2010. 
 
Bhatti, Ghazala. (2011) Outsiders or Insiders? Identity, Educational Success and 
Muslim Young Men in England,” Ethnography and Education, 6: (1) (2011), pp. 81–
96. 
 
Billaud, Julie. “Snapshots of British Islam: Exploring Self, Identity, and the Good 
Ethical Life in the Global Megalopolis,” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 
(2015), 1–26. Available at: 
http://jce.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/13/0891241615578904.full.pdf 
 
Borum, Randy. “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual 
Models and Empirical Research,” Journal of Strategic Security 4: (4), (2011), pp. 37–
62. 
 
Campbell, Colm, and Connolly, Ita. “A Model for the ‘War Against Terrorism’? Military 
Intervention in Northern Ireland and the 1970 Falls Curfew,” Journal of Law and 
Society 33: (3) (2008), pp.341-375. 
 
Cameron, David. “Extremism: PM Speech.” (2015) Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/extremism-pm-speech (accessed: 4 
August 2015). 
 
Census “Religion in England and Wales”. (2011) Available at:  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articl
es/religioninenglandandwales2011/2012-12-11 (accessed 26 January 2017). 
 
Chasmar, Jessica. “ISIL Using Twitter App ‘Dawn’ to Keep Jihadists Updated,” 
Washington Times, (2014). Available at: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jun/18/isil-using-twitter-app-dawn-keep-
jihadists-updated/ (accessed: 20 May 2015). 
 
Cheong, Pauline, Cheong, and Halverson, Jeffry “Youths in Violent Extremist 
Discourse: Mediated Identifications and Interventions,” Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism 33: (12) (2010), pp.1104–1123. 
 
Choudhury, Tufyal. “The Role of Muslim Identity Politics in Radicalisation” (a study in 
progress, London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007). 
Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/http://www.communities.
gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/452628 (accessed 10 June 2015). 
 
Choudhury, Tufyal and Fenwick, Helen. “The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures 
on Muslim Communities.” Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report, 
72. (2011) Available at. http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/ 
uploaded_files/research/counter-terrorism_research_report_72.pdf (accessed 26 
January 2016). 
 
Coppock, Vicki, and McGovern, Mark. “‘Dangerous Minds’? Deconstructing Counter-
Terrorism Discourse, Radicalisation and the ‘Psychological Vulnerability’ of 
Muslim Children and Young People in Britain,” Children & Society 28 (3), (2015) 
pp. 242–256. 
 
Cottee, Simon, and Hayward, Keith. “Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions 
of Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34:(12) (2011), pp. 963–986. 
 
Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What 
We Do Not Know.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33 (9) (2010), pp. 797–814. 
 
Dodd, Vikram, and Gani, Aisha. “Police Failed Us, Say Families of Girls Feared to 
Have Gone to Syria,” The Guardian, (2015). Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/06/syria-bound-girls-hid-police-
letter-families (accessed: 5 August 2015). 
 
Doosje, Bertjan, Loseman, Annemarie, and van den Bos, Kees. “Determinants of 
Radicalization of Islamic Youth in the Netherlands: Personal Uncertainty, Perceived 
Injustice, and Perceived Group Threat,” Journal of Social Issues 69 (3) (2013), pp. 
586–604. 
 
Drissel, David. “Pan-Islamist Networks of the Apocalypse: Mobilizing Diasporic 
Muslim Youth on Facebook,” in R.G. Howard (ed.), Network Apocalypse: Visions of 
the End in an Age of Internet Media, (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2011) pp. 
145–182.  
 
Fiegerman, Seth. “Facebook Messenger Now Has 500 Million Monthly Active Users.” 
(2014) Available at: http://mashable.com/2014/11/10/facebook-messenger-500-
million/ (accessed: 22 March 2015). 
 
Glees, Anthony, and Pope, Chris. When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and 
Extremist Activity on British Campuses. (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2005). 
 
Guru, Surinder. “Social Work Conflict: British Jihadists and Syrian Returnees and 
Social Work,” Social Dialogue, (2015) April, pp. 40–43. 
 
Harris, Anita, and Roose, Joshua. (2014) “DIY Citizenship amongst Young Muslims: 
Experiences of the ‘Ordinary’,” Journal of Youth Studies 17: (6), (2014), pp. 794–
813. 
 
Hogg, Michael, and Adelman, Janice. (2013) “Uncertainty–Identity Theory: Extreme 
Groups, Radical Behavior, and Authoritarian Leadership,” Journal of Social Issues 
69: (3), (2013), pp. 436–454. 
 
Hickman, Mary, Lyn Thomas, Henri Nickels, and Sara Silvestri “Social Cohesion and 
the Notion of ‘Suspect Communities’: A Study of the Experiences and Impacts of 
Being ‘Suspect’ for Irish Communities and Muslim Communities in Britain.” Critical 
Studies in Terrorism 5:(1) (2012), pp. 89–106. 
 
Hillyard, Paddy. Suspect Community: People’s Experiences of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Acts in Britain. (London: Pluto Press 1993). 
 
HM Government “Prevent Strategy. Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister 
and the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty.” 
(2011) Available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-
terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary (accessed: 
12 March 2015). 
 
Hoffman. Bruce. Inside Terrorism. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
 
Innes, Martin, Colin Roberts, Helen Innes, Trudy Lowe, and Suraj Lakhani. 
Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police 
Officers. (London: The Association of Chief Police Officers 2011). 
 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. “Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in 
Syria: Steep Rise among Western Europeans,” Insight (2013). Available at: 
http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-
western-europeans/ (accessed: 19 May 2015). 
 
Irshaid, Faisal. “How Isis Is Spreading Its Message Online,” BBC News, (2014). Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-27912569 (accessed: 12 May 2015).  
 
Kundnani, Arun. The Muslims Are Coming!: Islamophobia, Extremism and the 
Domestic War on Terror, (London and New York: Verso 2014). 
 
Lucas, Scott. “Syria Interview: Islamic State of Iraq’s Abu Sumayyah al-Britani on Conflict and 
Caliphate.” (2014) Available at: http://eaworldview.com/2014/06/syria-interview-islamic-state-
of-iraq-abu-sumayyah-al-britani-conflict-caliphate/ (accessed 22 May 2015).  
 
Malik, Shiv, and Siddique, Haroon. “‘Britain’s Youngest Suicide Bomber’ Mourned by 
West Yorkshire Family,” The Guardian, (2015). Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/14/west-yorkshire-teenager-talha-asmal-
britain-youngest-suicide-bomber (accessed 4 August 2015). 
 
Manningham-Buller, Eliza. (2011) “BBC Reith Lectures: Securing Freedom.” (2011) 
Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/rmhttp/radio4/transcripts/2011_reith3.pdf 
(accessed 4 August 2015). 
 
McCauley, Clark, and Moskalenko, Sophia. “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: 
Pathways toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20 (3), (2008), pp. 
415–433. 
 
McCauley, Clark, and Moskalenko, Sophia. “Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf 
Terrorists: What Moves an Individual from Radical Opinion to Radical Action,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (1), (2014), pp. 69–85.  
 
McVeigh, Tracy. “‘Police Betrayed Me,’ Says Mother of Imprisoned British Jihadi,” 
The Guardian, (2014). Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/06/yusuf-sarwar-mother-british-jihadist-
police-betray-syria (accessed 2 June 2015). 
 
Muslim Council of Britain. Response to the Counter-terrorism and Security Bill, 
(2015). Available at: http://www.mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Response-
to-the-Counter-Terrorism-and-Security-Bill.pdf (accessed 26/1/16). 
 
Ross, Alice, and Galey, Patrick. “Making People Stateless Is ‘Simply Wrong’, Say 
MPs ahead of Lords Debate, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, (2015). 
Available at: https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/03/17/making-people-
stateless-is-simply-wrong-say-mps-ahead-of-lords-debate/ (accessed 26 July 2015). 
 
Ryan, Louise. “‘Islam Does Not Change’: Young People Narrating Negotiations of 
Religion and Identity,” Journal of Youth Studies 17:(4), (2014), pp. 446–460. 
 
Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvannia Press, 
2008).  
 
Silke, Andrew. “Fire of Iolaus,” in Bjorg, T. (ed.), The Root Causes of Terrorism: 
Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, (New York: Routledge, 2005) pp. 242–248. 
 
Silke, Andrew. “Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi 
Radicalization,” European Journal of Criminology 5: (1), (2008), pp. 99–123. 
 
Soni, Darshna. “Can Returning Jihadis Be Reintegrated into Society?” Channel 4 
News, (2014). Available at: http://www.channel4.com/news/can-returning-jihadis-be-
reintegrated-into-society (accessed 4 August 2015). 
 
Tajfel, Henri, and Billig, Michael. “Familiarity and Categorization in Intergroup 
Behaviour,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 10 (1974), pp. 159–170. 
 
Tufail, Waqas, and Poynting, Scott. “A Common ‘Outlawness’: Criminalisation of 
Muslim Minorities in the UK and Australia,” International Journal for Crime, Justice 
and Social Democracy 2: (3) (2013), pp. 43–54. 
 
Twitter. “Usage Statistics.” (2014). Available at: 
http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/ (accessed 4 August 2014). 
 
Vertigans, Stephen. “British Muslims and the UK Government’s ‘War on Terror’ 
Within: Evidence of a Clash of Civilizations or Emergent De-civilizing Processes?” 
British Journal of Sociology 61:(1) (2010), pp. 24–44. 
 
Walklate, Sandra, and Mythen, Gabe. Contradictions of Terrorism: Security, Risk, 
Resilience. (London: Routledge, 2014). 
 
Wiktorowicz, Quniton. Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West. (Lanham 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). 
 
Whitehead, Tom. “Parents Urged to Inform on Would-be Jihadist Children,” The 
Telegraph, (2014). Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-
in-the-uk/10925889/Parents-urged-to-inform-on-would-be-jihadist-children.html 
(accessed 4 August 2015). 
 
Woods, David. “3-year-old among Hundreds of Children Identified as Potential 
Extremists,” ITV News, (2015). Available at: http://www.itv.com/news/london/2015-
07-27/3-year-old-among-hundreds-of-children-identified-as-potential-extremists/ 
(accessed 4 August 2015). 
 
YouTube Statistics. “Viewership.” (2014). Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/en-GB/statistics.html (accessed 20 December 
2014). 
 
